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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND
PENNSYLVANIA’S ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHTS AMENDMENT: APPLYING THE
DUTY OF IMPARTIALITY TO
DISCRIMINATORY SITING
Jacob Elkin∗
Since the 1970s, there has been a growing
awareness that environmental hazards are
disproportionately
sited
in
low-income
communities and communities of color. Under the
label of the environmental justice movement,
community groups have pursued various means to
fight against the discriminatory concentration of
environmental burdens in their neighborhoods.
Yet in its Civil Rights Act and Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
largely shut the door on federal environmental
justice litigation by requiring plaintiffs to prove
that the government acted with discriminatory
intent in its siting and permitting decisions.
This Note argues that Pennsylvania’s
Environmental Rights Amendment provides an
avenue for disparate impact environmental justice
litigation at the state level. In its 2013 Robinson
Township v. Commonwealth decision, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the
state’s Environmental Rights Amendment as
imposing significant public trust obligations on
the state legislature and other governmental
∗
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actors. While previous scholarship has analyzed
Robinson Township’s impact on environmental
constitutionalism generally, this Note focuses on
the decision’s environmental justice implications.
In particular, this Note argues that one public
trust duty imposed by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court—the duty of impartiality—should prohibit
state actors from continuing to site environmental
hazards in communities that already bear
disproportionate environmental burdens.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Advocates have long attempted to hold governments
accountable for the disproportionate siting of environmental
hazards such as landfills and power plants in communities of
color and low-income communities. Under the label of the
environmental justice movement, community groups have
pursued various means to fight against the concentration of
environmental burdens in their neighborhoods. 1 While the
movement has had a number of legal successes, including
President Clinton’s signing of Executive Order 12898 (“Federal
Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority
Populations and Low-Income Populations”), 2 federal litigation
strategies focused on combating environmental racism and
injustice have largely stalled.3
Several doctrinal roadblocks currently stand in the way
of federal environmental justice litigation. Under modern Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence, governmental actions with
racially disproportionate impacts are unconstitutional only when
the government acted with an intent to discriminate.4 Similarly,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act does not provide a private right of
action to combat discrimination unless the plaintiff can prove the
governmental agent in question acted with discriminatory
intent.5 It is incredibly hard—if not impossible—for litigants to
1 For a timeline of the environmental justice movement, including key
milestones, see ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
MILESTONES
AND
ACCOMPLISHMENTS:
1964–2014
(2014),
https://www.racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/Enviromental_justice.pdf
[https://perma.cc/88DP-AWSW].
2 EO 12898 directed that “each Federal agency . . . shall make achieving
environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing, as
appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations in the United States and its territories
and possessions, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
and the Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands.” Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed.
Reg. 7,629, 7,629 (Feb. 16, 1994). The order also mandated the creation of an
interagency working group on environmental justice. Id.
3 See Carlton Waterhouse, Abandon All Hope Ye That Enter? Equal
Protection, Title VI, and the Divine Comedy of Environmental Justice, 20
FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 51, 63–77 (2009).
4 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
5 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985); Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (1998). While the Civil Rights Act provides the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power to administratively remedy
disparate impact discrimination, the agency has largely failed to exercise that
power to protect citizens from environmental injustice. As of 2016, the EPA’s
Office of Civil Rights had never found a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act and was dismissing nine out of every ten complaints alleging environmental
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establish that state actors intended to discriminate when making
siting and permitting decisions.6 As a result, federal challenges
to pollution permits and waste facility siting decisions under the
Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act have uniformly
failed.7
While federal environmental justice litigation remains
largely thwarted, legal inroads at the state level can still be
made. 8 Optimistically, state-specific environmental justice
litigation could serve as a laboratory for nation-wide innovation,
and pragmatically, state courts may be the only viable forum left
for environmental justice litigation. 9 Building off this stateoriented approach, this Note argues that recent developments
under Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment
(Amendment), a 1971 amendment to the Pennsylvania
Constitution, present fertile ground for state litigation targeting
the continued siting and permitting of environmental burdens in
low-income communities and communities of color. Starting with
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has held that the Environmental Rights
Amendment imposes a “duty of impartiality” on the State,
requiring state actors to balance the interests of all residents
when making decisions that affect public natural resources such
as ambient air and water quality.10 While the scope of this duty
remains undefined, this Note argues that it could serve as the
foundation for litigation challenging discriminatory siting and
permitting decisions.
Part II of this Note presents background information
regarding patterns of environmental injustice in Pennsylvania
and the United States, attempts to litigate environmental
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and Civil
discrimination. Talia Buford & Kristen Lombardi, Report Slams EPA Civil
Rights Compliance, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 23, 2016),
https://publicintegrity.org/environment/report-slams-epa-civil-rightscompliance/ [https://perma.cc/AB8S-ABQL].
6 See Maria Ramirez Fisher, On the Road from Environmental Racism
to Environmental Justice, 5 VILL. ENV’T L.J. 449, 469 n.116 (1994) (“Critics
attack the imposition of the burden of establishing discriminatory intent on the
wrong party; discriminatory intent is easy to hide. Furthermore, since state
action is based on multiple motives, the government always can identify a nondiscriminatory motive for its action.”) (citation omitted).
7 Waterhouse, supra note 3, at 53.
8 Robert J. Klee, What’s Good for School Finance Should Be Good for
Environmental Justice: Addressing Disparate Environmental Impacts Using
State Courts and Constitutions, 30 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 135, 136 (2005).
9 Id. at 158–60.
10 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 957 (Pa. 2013).
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Rights Act, and the early history of Pennsylvania’s
Environmental Rights Amendment. Part III explores Robinson
Township’s effect on jurisprudence under the Environmental
Rights Amendment, focusing on the “duty of impartiality” as it is
framed in the opinion and subsequent case law. Part IV argues
that the duty imposes substantive obligations on state actors to
cease siting environmental burdens in communities that are
already disproportionately affected, as well as procedural
obligations to consider the cumulative impact of environmental
decision-making on affected communities when making siting
and permitting decisions. Then, Part V analyzes whether other
state constitutions provide the framework for similar
developments.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN
PENNSYLVANIA AND THE UNITED STATES
Numerous studies show that the distribution of
environmental burdens in the United States is concentrated in
communities of color and low-income communities. 11 This
unfortunate fact is replicated within Pennsylvania.12 Litigants
both in Pennsylvania and around the country have attempted to
use the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act to hold government actors
accountable for concentration of environmental hazards in their
communities, but Supreme Court jurisprudence has effectively
foreclosed the potential for such litigation by requiring private
litigants to prove discriminatory intent.13
Part II.A presents the substantial evidence of
environmental inequality throughout the United States and
Pennsylvania, and Part II.B summarizes the federal
constitutional and statutory challenges to such inequality. Part
II.C
introduces
Pennsylvania’s
Environmental
Rights
Amendment, a provision that could serve as the basis for future
environmental justice litigation.

11 For an extensive review of such studies, see LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA
R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT app. at 167–83 (2001).
12 See
FOOD & WATER WATCH, PERNICIOUS PLACEMENT OF
PENNSYLVANIA POWER PLANTS: NATURAL GAS-FIRED POWER PLANT BOOM
REINFORCES
ENVIRONMENTAL
INJUSTICE
(2018),
https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/rpt_1806_pagasplants_w
eb3.pdf [https://perma.cc/RR74-4NRD].
13 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293
(2001).
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A. The Distribution of Environmental Burdens in the United
States and Pennsylvania
The first information about distributional environmental
inequities was published in 1971 in an annual report of the White
House’s Council on Environmental Quality.14 Roughly a decade
later, studies published in the 1980s enhanced the public
understanding that environmental burdens were inequitably
distributed along race and class lines. In a 1983 study, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office found a correlation between
the location of hazardous waste landfills and the racial and
economic status of the surrounding communities in eight
southeastern states.15 Several years later, the United Church of
Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice conducted a nationwide
study, titled Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, that
concluded that race was an important variable associated with
the siting of commercial hazardous waste facilities. 16 This
research set the framework for numerous other studies into the
inequitable distribution of environmental hazards.17
In their 2001 book From the Ground Up: Environmental
Racism and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement,
Luke W. Cole18 and Sheila R. Foster19 surveyed the numerous
14 Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Race, Poverty & the Distribution of
Environmental Hazards: Reviewing the Evidence, RACE, POVERTY & ENV’T, Fall
1991–Winter 1992, at 24.
15 U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF HAZARDOUS
WASTES LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983). The study focused on EPA
Region 4 (Southeast), id., which includes Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. About EPA Region
4 (Southeast), U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/aboutepa-region-4-southeast [https://perma.cc/JX7L-FGTU] (last visited Aug. 23,
2020).
16 UNITED CHURCH CHRIST COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUST., TOXIC WASTES
AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE
SITES 9 (1987).
17 See e.g., COLE & FOSTER, supra note 11, at app. at 167–83.
18 Luke Cole was the Co-Founder and Director of the Center on Race,
Poverty, and the Environment, a national environmental justice organization
that provides legal, organizing, and technical assistance to grassroots groups in
low-income communities and communities of color. Luke’s Legacy, CTR. ON RACE
POVERTY
&
ENV’T,
https://crpe-ej.org/donate-main/lukes-legacy/
[https://perma.cc/D3SN-7UQM] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). He has been widely
recognized as an early leader in the environmental justice movement. Dennis
Hevesi, Luke Cole, Court Advocate for Minorities, Dies at 46, N.Y. TIMES (June
10,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/us/11cole.html
[https://perma.cc/9AG3-8JCH].
19 Sheila Foster is a Professor of Law and Public Policy at Georgetown
University. She co-edited The Law of Environmental Justice: Theories and
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studies and articles that analyzed the distribution of
environmental hazards such as “garbage dumps, air pollution,
lead poisoning, toxic waste production and disposal, pesticide
poisoning, noise pollution, occupational hazards, and rat bites.”20
These studies “overwhelming[ly]” concluded that “environmental
hazards are inequitably distributed by income or race.” 21
Furthermore, studies comparing the distribution of hazards by
income and race found that race was the more consistent
predictor of exposure to environmental dangers.22
Contemporary studies continue to show a substantial
correlation between the location of environmental hazards and
the predominant race of surrounding communities. 23 A 2018
study by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) scientists
found that “non-Whites and those living in poverty face a
disproportionate burden from [particulate matter]-emitting
facilities.”24 The study also found that Black people “in particular
are likely to live in high-emission areas.” 25 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals recently recognized this issue, noting that
“recent studies have shown that environmental pollution,
including from landfills, has a disparate impact on racial-ethnic
minorities and low-income communities.”26 Furthermore, since
low-income communities and communities of color are home to a
disproportionate number of polluting sites, they are particularly
affected by the Trump Administration’s weakening of
environmental protections.27

Procedures to Address Disproportionate Risks with Michael B. Gerrard. Sheila
Foster,
GEO.
L.
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/sheila-foster/
[https://perma.cc/M7PF-V8RM] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
20 COLE & FOSTER, supra note 11, at 54.
21 Id. at 54–55.
22 Id. at 55.
23 Ihab Mikati et al., Disparities in Distribution of Particulate Matter
Emission Sources by Race and Poverty Status, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 480
(2018).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Baptiste v. Bethlehem Landfill Co., 965 F.3d 214, 226 (3d Cir. 2020)
(citing Christopher W. Tessum et al., Inequity in Consumption of Goods and
Services Adds to Racial-Ethnic Disparities in Air Pollution Exposure, 116 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6001, 6001 (2019); Kathy Seward Northern, Battery and
Beyond: A Tort Law Response to Environmental Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENV’T
L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 498–505 (1997)).
27 Rebecca Beitsch, Critics Warn Trump’s Latest Environmental
Rollback Could Hit Minorities, Poor Hardest, HILL (Jan. 12, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/477798-critics-warn-trumpslatest-environmental-rollback-could-hit [https://perma.cc/GJ9C-6Z62].
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The concentration of environmental hazards in lowincome communities and communities of color, and the
cumulative exposure to multiple environmental health stressors,
severely impairs public health in those communities. 28 The
effects of industrial development accumulate; while one single
source of environmental harm may seem insignificant, the
addition of many small impacts greatly increases the cause for
concern.29 In the environmental justice context, the cumulative
impact of exposure to disproportionate numbers of polluting
facilities correlates with asthma hospitalization rates.30
In line with the national data, environmental hazards in
Pennsylvania are concentrated in low-income Black and Latinx

28
See EJ 2020 Glossary, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://epa.gov/environmentaljustice/ej-2020-glossary [https://perma.cc/MJV4NP2H] (last visited Aug. 24, 2020) (“Overburdened Community—Minority, lowincome, tribal, or indigenous populations or geographic locations in the United
States that potentially experience disproportionate environmental harms and
risks. This disproportionality can be as a result of greater vulnerability to
environmental hazards, lack of opportunity for public participation, or other
factors. Increased vulnerability may be attributable to an accumulation of
negative or lack of positive environmental, health, economic, or social conditions
within these populations or places. The term describes situations where multiple
factors, including both environmental and socio-economic stressors, may act
cumulatively to affect health and the environment and contribute to persistent
environmental health disparities.”). See also Rachel Morello-Frosch et al.,
Understanding the Cumulative Impacts of Inequalities in Environmental Health:
Implications for Policy, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 879, 881 (2011) (“Numerous studies
have documented the disproportionate location of hazardous waste sites,
industrial facilities, sewage treatment plants, and other locally undesirable and
potentially polluting land uses in communities of racial or ethnic minorities and
in socially disadvantaged neighborhoods. Residents living near such facilities
can be exposed to more pollutants than people who live in more affluent
neighborhoods located farther from these sources of pollution. The residents of
communities near industrial and hazardous waste sites experience an increased
risk of adverse perinatal outcomes, respiratory and heart diseases, psychosocial
stress, and mental health impacts.”).
29 See INDIAN & N. AFFS. CAN., A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO CUMULATIVE
EFFECTS
2
(2007),
https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTERNWT/STAGING/texte-text/ntr_pubs_CEG_1330635861338_eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4GM2-ZG8Z]. EPA’s Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
defines cumulative impact as “the impact on the environment which results from
the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or nonFederal) or person undertakes such other actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2020).
CEQ further notes that “[c]umulative impacts can result from minor but
collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.” Id.
30 See Emanuel Alcala et al., Cumulative Impact of Environmental
Pollution and Population Vulnerability on Pediatric Asthma Hospitalizations: A
Multilevel Analysis of CalEnviroScreen, 16 INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH
2683 (2019).
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communities. 31 In fact, Pennsylvania has the second largest
racial “pollution gap” among all of the states.32 Furthermore, a
2018 study found that Pennsylvania’s 136 existing, new, and
proposed fuel-fired power plants are disproportionately located
near disadvantaged communities, defined as “areas with lower
incomes, higher economic stress, lower educational levels and/or
communities of color.”33 This distributional inequity manifests in
the health of these communities, with Pennsylvania’s Black and
Latinx populations considerably more likely to experience
negative health effects from pollution than its white population.34
For example, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection (PADEP or DEP) found that the 2011 asthma
hospitalization rate was five times higher for Black residents of
Pennsylvania than for white residents.35
PADEP has responded to this inequity by creating an
Office of Environmental Justice, which serves “as a point of
contact for Pennsylvania residents in low income areas and areas
with a higher number of minorities,” and has a “primary goal” of
“increas[ing] communities’ environmental awareness and
involvement in the DEP permitting process.” 36 The Office has
publicized a map of Environmental Justice areas in
Pennsylvania, defined as “any census tract where 20 percent or
more individuals live in poverty, and/or 30 percent or more of the
population is minority.” 37 The Office’s Environmental Justice
See FOOD & WATER WATCH, supra note 12.
Sydney Brownstone, The 10 Most Polluted States for People of Color,
FAST CO. (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3029160/the-10-mostpolluted-states-for-people-of-color [https://perma.cc/4U6F-FV87].
33 See FOOD & WATER WATCH, supra note 12, at 2.
34 Id. at 6–7. While not correlated with race, the recent boom in
unconventional gas production, referred to as “hydraulic fracturing” or
“fracking,” has been concentrated in low-income, rural areas, leading to
numerous negative health effects and dangers for those communities. See FOOD
& WATER WATCH, supra note 12, at 7; Elena Pacheco, It’s a Fracking
Conundrum: Environmental Justice and the Battle to Regulate Hydraulic
Fracturing, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q. 373, 380 (2015).
35 Pennsylvania Asthma Surveillance System, PA. DEP’ T H EALTH,
https://www.health.pa.gov/topics/programs/Asthma/Pages/SurveillanceReports.aspx [https://perma.cc/4GEV-CTPT] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020). In its
study, PADEP did not attribute the differing asthma hospitalization rate to any
particular cause.
36 Office
of Environmental Justice, PA. DEP’T ENV’T PROT.,
https://www.dep.pa.gov/PublicParticipation/OfficeofEnvironmentalJustice/Page
s/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/3MPV-TYRT] (last visited Aug. 24, 2020).
37 Pa.
Environmental Justice Areas, PA. DEP’T ENV’T PROT.
https://www.dep.pa.gov/PublicParticipation/OfficeofEnvironmentalJustice/Page
s/PA-Environmental-Justice-Areas.aspx [https://perma.cc/62HG-K8HR] (last
visited Aug. 24, 2020).
31
32

204

COLUM. J. RACE & L.

[Vol. 11:195

Advisory Work Group also helped create PADEP’s 2004
Enhanced Public Participation Policy, which triggers community
outreach, public participation, and public meeting requirements
when certain types of permits are proposed in Environmental
Justice areas.38
The Enhanced Public Participation Policy grew out of a
2001 report from Pennsylvania’s then-formed Environmental
Justice Work Group, 39 which detailed Pennsylvania’s
environmental justice history and recommended ways to “level[]
the playing field” by devoting attention, energy, and resources to
“the environmental health and safety of minority and low-income
communities.”40 Along with its suggestion for enhanced public
participation in the permitting process, the report recommended
that PADEP examine the feasibility of mitigating the cumulative
and/or disparate impacts of environmental permitting decisions
and determine whether the benefits of the proposed activity
outweigh the harm to the community. 41 These mitigation
measures have not been implemented in state policy, and
Pennsylvania’s low-income communities and communities of
color continue to be disproportionately affected by the state’s
permitting of environmental hazards.42
Of course, in Pennsylvania and nationally, the correlation
between race, socioeconomic status, and the distribution of
environmental burdens does not establish causation. The siting
of environmental hazards in communities of color can be
explained—at least in part—by ostensibly race-neutral siting
criteria and market factors including cheap land values and
appropriate zoning. 43 Yet, those “race-neutral” siting factors
must be contextualized within the country’s history of
discriminatory land use policies that include explicitly racial
38 PA. DEP’T ENV’T PROT. POL’Y OFF., 012-0501-002, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE
PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION
POLICY
(Apr.
24,
2004),
http://www.depgreenport.state.pa.us/elibrary/GetDocument?docId=7918&DocN
ame=ENVIRONMENTAL%20JUSTICE%20PUBLIC%20PARTICIPATION%20
POLICY.PDF [https://perma.cc/R2SJ-5P8V]. This process applies to NPDES
(water) Permits, Air Permits, Waste Permits, Mining Permits, Land Application
of Biosolids Permits, and CAFO (Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation)
Permits. Id. at 8.
39 Id. at 3.
40 ENV’T JUST.
WORK GRP, REPORT TO THE PENNSYLVANIA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
13
(June
2001),
http://files.dep.state.pa.us/PublicParticipation/Office%20of%20Environmental
%20Advocacy/lib/environadvocate/EJReportFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/32BMGU9E]
41 Id. at 16–18.
42 See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
43 See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 12, at 70–74.
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zoning,44 racially restrictive covenants,45 and redlining.46 These
historical practices continue to drive segregation: as examples,
Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, and Philadelphia all extensively
utilized racially restrictive covenants, and those cities ranked
first, eighth, tenth, and twelfth respectively in African American
residential segregation as of 1990.47 Furthermore, zoning bodies
have historically “down-zoned” Black communities to industrial
status while zoning similarly situated white neighborhoods as
“residential.” 48 Down-zoning then creates a cycle where new
industrial development lowers land values, thereby attracting
more industry, thereby lowering land values further. 49 Put
generally, present-day siting criteria overlay a history of land use
decision-making that is all but race-neutral, and those criteria
continue to concentrate polluting facilities in low-income
communities of color.50 The question then becomes: what role can
and should the law play in remedying that inequity?

44 See Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a
Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L.
REV. 739, 744–45 (1993) (“Shortly after the turn of the century, when legally
enforced segregation approached its zenith, several southern and border cities
enacted strict racial zoning ordinances designating separate residential districts
for whites and blacks. Such ordinances were a response to the mass migration
of southern rural blacks to the cities and to white residents’ fears of racial
amalgamation. Baltimore passed the first such ordinance in 1910 and within six
years more than a dozen cities followed suit.”).
45 See id. at 751. (“The use of racially restrictive covenants mushroomed
during the 1930s and 1940s, particularly in the northern, western, and midwestern regions of the country.”).
46 See id. at 752 (“The [Federal Housing Administration] also
encouraged the use of racial covenants and denied mortgage insurance to entire
‘redlined’ black and integrated neighborhoods based on the belief that black
residents caused a devaluation of property.”). Redlining “denotes the practice of
denying mortgage financing on property located within certain geographic areas
of a city.” Id. at 752 n.57 (quoting Marcia Duncan et al., Redlining Practices,
Racial Resegregation, and Urban Decay: Neighborhood Housing Services as a
Viable Alternative, 7 URB. L. 510, 513 (1975)).
47 See Dubin, supra note 44, at 751 n. 54 (citation omitted).
48 See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 12, at 73.
49 Id. at 72.
50 Other ostensibly race-neutral siting criteria have similar effects. See
id. at 73–74 (“Proximity to major transportation routes may also skew the siting
process toward communities of color, as freeways appear to be disproportionately
sited in such communities. Similarly, locational criteria—prohibitions against
the siting of waste facilities near neighborhood amenities like hospitals and
schools—skew the process toward underdeveloped communities of color, since
such communities are less likely to have hospitals and schools. Hence, siting
criteria that prohibit the siting of waste facilities close to such facilities
perpetuate the historical lack of such amenities in those communities.”).
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B. Federal Environmental Justice Litigation Under the Equal
Protection Clause and Civil Rights Act
In response to the overwhelming concentration of
environmental hazards in low-income communities and
communities of color outlined above, community groups and
public interest legal organizations nationwide have brought
numerous suits under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
challenging the practice of discriminatory siting. This litigation
has been unsuccessful in holding governmental actors
accountable for siting and permitting practices that
disproportionately harm Black and Latinx communities,
primarily because the Supreme Court has proven reluctant to
impose liability on governmental actors without proof that the
action arose from an intent to discriminate.51
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits
states from “deny[ing] to any person within [their] jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws,”52 would appear to prohibit the
enforcement of siting and permitting schemes that sacrifice the
health of low-income communities and communities of color for
the benefit of wealthier, whiter communities. As such, numerous
plaintiffs have brought suits alleging that the siting of landfills
in their predominantly Black communities violated their rights
under the Equal Protection Clause. 53 Yet, these claims have
failed because the plaintiffs could prove only that the landfill
siting produced disproportionate racial impacts, rather than
prove that the government acted with discriminatory intent.54
Following the 1976 case Washington v. Davis, “a law or
other official act . . . is [not] unconstitutional [s]olely because it
has a racially disproportionate impact.” 55 Furthermore, even
when plaintiffs can prove that governmental action was
“motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose,” the
government may still escape liability if it can prove that “the
same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible

51 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[A] law or other
official act . . . is [not] unconstitutional Solely [sic] because it has a racially
disproportionate impact.”).
52 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
53 See, e.g., R.I.S.E. v. Kay, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); East-Bibb
Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon Bibb Plan. & Zoning Comm’n, 896 F.2d
1264 (11th Cir. 1989).
54 R.I.S.E., 977 F.2d at 2; East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n, 896
F.2d at 1267.
55 Washington, 426 U.S. at 239.
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purpose not been considered.” 56 While the Court in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation stated that the discriminatory impact of official
action could serve as evidence of discriminatory intent,57 it has
since ignored this aspect of its opinion. 58 As a result,
environmental justice plaintiffs must look elsewhere for proof
that governmental actors intended to discriminate when siting
environmental hazards, but discriminatory intent is easy to hide,
and siting decisions are often based on multiple criteria that are
facially non-discriminatory.59
Similar roadblocks have stalled environmental litigation
brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Title VI is the most
far-reaching part of the Civil Rights Act, since it requires
compliance by all recipients of federal funds. 60 Section 601
mandates that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 61 Section 602 authorizes and directs
federal agencies, including the EPA, to promulgate antidiscrimination regulations that give force to section 601. 62 As
Title VI targets discrimination generally, it has been the
statutory basis for significant environmental justice litigation.63
This litigation has also proven unsuccessful. As with the
Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has held that
challengers to government action under section 601 of the Civil
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
270 n.21 (1977).
57 Id. at 266.
58 Robert Nelson, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminatory Purpose:
Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 334, 341 (1986) (citing
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598
(1985); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1980); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
59 See Fisher, supra note 6, at 469 n.116 (“Critics attack the imposition
of the burden of establishing discriminatory intent on the wrong party;
discriminatory intent is easy to hide. Furthermore, since state action is based on
multiple motives, the government always can identify a non-discriminatory
motive for its action.”).
60 See Tony LoPresti, Realizing the Promise of Environmental Civil
Rights: The Renewed Effort to Enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 65
ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 763 (2013).
61 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018).
62 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2018). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.10–7.135 (the
EPA’s nondiscrimination regulations promulgated pursuant to section 602).
63 See, e.g., Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132
F.3d 925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, 524 U.S. 974 (1998); S. Camden Citizens Action
v. N.J. Dep’t Env’t Prot., 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001).
56
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Rights Act must prove that the government acted with a
discriminatory intent; proving that a particular government
action had a disparate impact on certain groups is insufficient to
establish a civil rights violation. 64 For the reasons outlined
above, plaintiffs face near-insurmountable burdens in
establishing that officials intended to discriminate when making
siting decisions. Accordingly, most cases of environmental
discrimination cannot be litigated under section 601.
While litigants must prove that violations of section 601
of the Civil Rights Act arose from discriminatory intent in order
to obtain restitution, agencies can still prohibit disparate impact
discrimination through regulation.65 As a result, private litigants
have attempted to use section 602 regulations to challenge
discriminatory siting of environmental hazards, and one such
lawsuit—Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v.
Seif—directly challenged siting practices in Pennsylvania.66
The town of Chester is located in Delaware County,
Pennsylvania. As of 2002, Delaware County, excluding Chester,
was 6.2% African American, while Chester itself was 65% African
American.67 Additionally, Chester’s median family income was
45% lower than the rest of Delaware County’s and its poverty
rate was more than three times higher.68 In an emblematic case
of environmental racism, five of the seven commercial waste
facilities that PADEP permitted in Delaware County between
1986 and 1996 were located in Chester. 69 Furthermore, the
county processed all of its municipal waste and sewage in
Chester, and over 60% of the county’s waste-processing
industries were located in the township.70
Chester residents organized to challenge the continued
siting of waste facilities in their community. In Chester Residents
64 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (“Title VI [of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964] itself directly reached only instances of intentional
discrimination.”).
65 See id. (“[A]ctions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on
minorities could be redressed through agency regulations designed to implement
the purposes of Title VI.”); but see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281–82
(2001) (assuming for the purposes of deciding the case that “regulations
promulgated under § 602 of Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a
disparate impact on racial groups” but noting that such regulations are in
“considerable tension with the rule of Bakke and Guardians that § 601 forbids
only intentional discrimination”).
66 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 132 F.3d. at 927.
67 COLE & FOSTER, supra note 11, at 34.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 34–35.
70 Id. at 35.
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Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, Chester Residents
Concerned for Quality Living (CRCQL), a local grassroots
environmental justice organization, 71 argued that PADEP’s
issuance of a permit to Soil Remediation Services to operate a
waste processing facility in Chester violated section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act, the EPA’s civil rights regulations promulgated
pursuant to section 602, and PADEP’s assurance that it would
not violate those regulations.72 The Third Circuit considered the
section 602 claim on appeal, and held that Chester residents had
a private right of action under regulations passed pursuant to
section 602 to sue PADEP for siting practices that had racially
disparate impacts. 73 However, that potentially-landmark
decision was vacated after PADEP’s denial of an operations
permit to Soil Reclamation Services rendered the case moot.74
Soon after Chester, the Supreme Court shut the door on
similar litigation, holding that no private right of action existed
under Title VI to enforce section 602 regulations.75 In Alexander
v. Sandoval, a driver’s license applicant claimed that the
Department of Justice violated an anti-discrimination regulation
promulgated pursuant to section 602 by administering state
driver's license examinations only in English, which had the
effect of subjecting non-English speakers to discrimination based
on their national origin.76 Justice Scalia wrote for the majority:
“Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI
display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action
to enforce regulations promulgated under section 602. We
therefore hold that no such right of action exists.”77 As a result,
one more avenue for environmental justice was closed to
potential litigants.
After Sandoval prevented litigants from enforcing section
602 regulations directly, environmental justice activists
attempted to enforce those regulations through 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
71
Chester
Environmental
Justice,
EJNET,
http://www.ejnet.org/chester/ [https://perma.cc/ML2N-8V7S] (last visited Mar.
23, 2020).
72 Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925,
927–28 (3d Cir. 1997).
73 Id. at 937.
74 Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, 524 U.S. 974
(1998); Rick Kearns, Chester Lawsuit Declared Moot by U.S. Supreme Court:
Environmental Justice Still Doable Through Courts Despite Recent Supreme
Court Decision, EJNET (Oct. 6, 1998), https://www.ejnet.org/chester/moot.html
[https://perma.cc/8JPC-6ZNU].
75 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
76 Id. at 278–79.
77 Id. at 293.
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a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which provides a
remedy for deprivation under color of state law of “any rights . . .
secured by the Constitution and laws.” 78 In South Camden
Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection, a community organization sued the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), claiming
that its decision to issue an air pollution permit to a cement
processing facility would produce a racially discriminatory
impact.79 Prior to the Sandoval decision, the New Jersey District
Court held that plaintiffs could sue NJDEP under section 602.80
Immediately following Sandoval and its preclusion of such a
section 602 claim, the District Court allowed the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint and add a claim to enforce section 602
through § 1983.81 However, on appeal, the Third Circuit held that
disparate impact regulations promulgated pursuant to section
602 cannot create private rights enforceable under § 1983, since
only Congress, and not administrative agencies or courts, can
create such rights.82 After much litigation, environmental justice
advocates were once again unable to hold governmental actors
accountable for siting and permitting decisions that
disproportionately harmed low-income communities and
communities of color. Federal law in general had failed to provide
private causes of action to combat environmental discrimination,
rendering state law the only viable avenue for such actions.83
C. Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment
In May 1971, Pennsylvania formally adopted its
Environmental Rights Amendment under article 1, section 27 of
its constitution.84 The Environmental Rights Amendment arose
from the Pennsylvania Legislature’s general effort, beginning in
1965, to reverse the history of widespread environmental
destruction in the state. 85 Representative Franklin L. Kury
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
S. Camden Citizens Action v. N.J. Dep’t Env’t Prot., 274 F.3d 771,
775–76 (3d Cir. 2001).
80 Id. at 776.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 790.
83 Klee, supra note 8, at 160.
84 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
85 Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment, CONSERVATION
ADVOC., https://conservationadvocate.org/pennsylvanias-environmental-rightsamendment/ [https://perma.cc/W8JX-8LYT] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020);
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 976 (Pa. 2013) (“As we have
explained, Pennsylvania has a notable history of what appears retrospectively
to have been a shortsighted exploitation of its bounteous environment, affecting
its minerals, its water, its air, its flora and fauna, and its people. The lessons
78
79
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drafted the Amendment and introduced the associated House
Bill, citing the need for an “over-all governmental framework in
which to carry on the fight for conservation . . . that is clearly
stated and beyond question . . . [and] will firmly guide the
legislature, the executive and the courts alike.” 86 As
Pennsylvania law requires,87 the General Assembly approved the
Amendment in two successive legislative sessions—first in 1969–
70 and then in 1971–72—before a majority of voters approved it
in a public referendum on May 18, 1971.88
As enacted, the Amendment reads as follows:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water,
and to the preservation of the natural, scenic,
historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
maintain them for the benefit of all the people.89
At the time of its proposal, commentators hoped that the
Amendment would be more than a “statement of policy,” and
would instead give “citizens a weapon which may be used in the
courts, in litigation, to protect and enhance the quality of [their]
environment.”90 Representative Kury claimed that he drafted the
Amendment to “strengthen substantially the legal weapons
available to protect our environment from further destruction.”91
Despite the legislature’s clear intention for the
Amendment to serve as a substantive legal tool in the hands of
Pennsylvania’s citizens, the Pennsylvania judiciary soon
undermined the Amendment’s force. In Payne v. Kassab,
responding to an action to enjoin a street-widening project that
would result in the taking of part of a river, the Commonwealth

learned from that history led directly to the Environmental Rights Amendment,
a measure which received overwhelming support from legislators and the voters
alike.”).
86 John C. Dernbach & Edmund J. Sonnenberg, A Legislative History of
Article I, Section 27 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
24 WIDENER L.J. 181, 189–90 (2015).
87 See PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
88 Dernbach & Sonnenberg, supra note 86, at 184.
89 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
90 Robert Broughton, Analysis of HB 958, the Proposed Pennsylvania
Environmental Declaration of Rights, 41 PA. BAR ASS’N Q. 421 (1969–70),
reprinted in Dernbach & Sonnenberg, supra note 86, at 220.
91 Dernbach & Sonnenberg, supra note 86, at 271.
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Court92 established a three-part test for determining whether a
state actor violated its public trust duties under the
Environmental Rights Amendment:
The court’s role must be to test the decision under
review by a threefold standard: (1) Was there
compliance with all applicable statutes and
regulations relevant to the protection of the
Commonwealth’s public natural resources? (2)
Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort
to reduce the environmental incursion to a
minimum? (3) Does the environmental harm
which will result from the challenged decision or
action so clearly outweigh the benefits to be
derived therefrom that to proceed further would
be an abuse of discretion?93
The Court claimed that this test established a “realistic” rather
than “legalistic” standard for judicial review, 94 and the Payne
test quickly replaced the text of the Environmental Rights
Amendment as the “all-purpose test for applying article I, section
27 when there is a claim that the Amendment itself has been
violated.”95
On its face, Payne established an almost insurmountable
bar for challengers to state action. As long as the state actor in
question complied with applicable statutes and regulations, the
courts would largely defer to the state’s decision-making
process.96 Accordingly, during the roughly four decades in which
Payne was good law, only one of twenty-four court cases decided
under the Payne test found that the state had violated the
92 The Commonwealth Court is one of Pennsylvania’s two statewide
intermediate appellate courts. It is primarily responsible for matters involving
state and local governments and regulatory agencies, and it acts as a trial court
in suits filed by or against the Commonwealth. Learn, UNIFIED JUD. SYS. PA.,
http://www.pacourts.us/learn/ [https://perma.cc/V7CM-VHJ5] (Nov. 2016).
93 Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d, 323
A.2d 407 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974), aff’d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
94 Id.
95 John C. Dernbach et al., Recognition of Environmental Rights for
Pennsylvania Citizens: Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 803, 812–13 (2018)
[hereinafter Dernbach et al., Recognition of Environmental Rights] (quoting Pa.
Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, No. 228 M.D. 2012, 2013 WL 3942086, at
*8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 22, 2013)).
96 See Payne, 361 A.2d at 273 (“Having determined that Act 120 was
complied with, we have no hesitation in deciding that the appellee
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not failed in its duties as trustee under the
constitutional article.”).
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Environmental Rights Amendment, and only eight of fifty-five
cases heard by the Environmental Hearing Board—which hears
appeals of PADEP decisions97—found the same.98
After four decades of undermining the Environmental
Rights Amendment under the Payne test, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court did a significant about-face in its 2013 plurality
opinion in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth. 99 In a
landmark opinion, the supreme court dismissed Payne as
incompatible with the Environmental Rights Amendment’s text
and interpreted the Amendment to provide a number of
significant protections to citizens. 100 While the section of the
opinion that interprets and applies the Environmental Rights
Amendment was joined by a mere plurality of the justices,
making it non-precedential, much of that section’s content was
reiterated in the subsequent majority opinion of Pennsylvania
Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth (PEDF).101
The PEDF opinion likewise dismissed the Payne test and
interpreted the text of the Amendment as granting
environmental protections that largely overlap with those
granted by the plurality in Robinson Township.102 Part III of this
Note further discusses the degree to which the PEDF decision
codified—or failed to codify—key aspects of the Robinson
Township opinion.
The
Robinson
Township
decision
overhauled
Pennsylvania’s jurisprudence under the Environmental Rights
Amendment and serves as the current bedrock for environmental
Welcome,
PA.
ENV’T
HEARING
BD.,
http://ehb.courtapps.com/public/index.php [https://perma.cc/BW2R-GRQQ] (last
visited Mar. 22, 2020).
98
John C. Dernbach & Marc Prokopchak, Recognition of
Environmental Rights for Pennsylvania Citizens: A Tribute to Chief Justice
Castille, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 335, 344–48 (2015).
99 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 967 (Pa. 2013).
Robinson Township again reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2016,
although that opinion does not concern the Environmental Rights Amendment
and is therefore not discussed in this Note. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth,
147 A.3d 536 (Pa. 2016).
100 Id.
101 See Frederick v. Allegheny Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 196 A.3d 677,
713 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018) (Ceisler, J., dissenting) (“Our Court has, in the
past, expressed a clear desire to limit the Robinson Township plurality’s
persuasive power as much as possible. . . . However, given the Supreme Court’s
PEDF II opinion, in which the majority liberally quotes and repeatedly cites
Robinson Township, I believe we must now recognize that authority of former
Chief Justice Castille’s plurality opinion has been greatly enhanced.”) (citation
omitted).
102 Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916 (Pa.
2017).
97
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constitutionalism in the state.103 It also presents a new inroad for
environmental justice litigation. Part III summarizes this
decision and subsequent case-law in this context.
III. ROBINSON TOWNSHIP AND THE DUTY
OF IMPARTIALITY
The Robinson Township court finally established the
Environmental Rights Amendment as a legitimate and practical
tool for environmental advocates in Pennsylvania. Part III.A
provides an overview of the Robinson Township opinion and
describes its relationship to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
later PEDF decision.104 Part III.B narrows in on these decisions’
still-unsettled environmental justice implications and outlines
two alternate understandings of Pennsylvania’s obligations
under the Environmental Rights Amendment. Under the
Robinson Township approach, state actors are bound by a
substantive duty to avoid environmental decision-making that
disproportionately harms certain communities; 105 under the
PEDF approach, they must merely consider those
disproportionate impacts in their decision-making process.106 As
Part III.B illustrates, neither of these two understandings has
firmly settled in Pennsylvania environmental law, leaving room
for environmental justice advocates to shape the law through
future litigation.
A. The Robinson Township and PEDF Decisions
In Robinson Township, seven municipalities, an
environmental organization, two individuals, and a physician
collectively challenged several provisions of Act 13 of 2012, a set
of amendments to Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act designed to
foster unconventional gas production (hydraulic fracturing or
fracking).107 Among a number of other claims, the challengers
103 John C. Dernbach et al., Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania: Examination and Implications, 67 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1169, 1195
(2015) [hereinafter Dernbach et al., Examination and Implications] (“The
plurality’s opinion in Robinson Township, however, opens the door to fresh
interpretations of constitutionally-embedded environmental rights provisions,
especially those found to be ‘on par’ with other constitutional rights.”).
104 Pa. Env’t Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 916.
105 See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 980 (Pa. 2013)
(“This disparate effect is irreconcilable with the express command that the
trustee will manage the corpus of the trust for the benefit of ‘all the people.’ A
trustee must treat all beneficiaries equitably in light of the purposes of the
trust.”) (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 27).
106 See Pa. Env’t Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 933 (“The duty of impartiality
requires the trustee to manage the trust so as to give all of the beneficiaries due
regard for their respective interests in light of the purposes of the trust.”).
107 Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 98, at 352.
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argued that several of the act’s provisions violated the
Environmental Rights Amendment. 108 The court ruled
unconstitutional sections of the act that asserted that the act
preempted and superseded all local regulation of oil and gas
operations;109 that mandated state-wide uniformity among local
ordinances to allow for “the reasonable development of oil and
gas resources”; 110 that required localities to permit industrial
uses as a matter of right in every type of pre-existing zoning
district; 111 and that mandated the PADEP to waive setback
requirements for gas development as long as a permit applicant
submitted a plan to protect Commonwealth waters. 112 Of
particular relevance in the environmental justice context, the
court based its ruling in part on the fact that the blanket
provisions of the ordinance ignored the reality that industrial
uses would “carry much heavier environmental and habitability
burdens [in some communities] than others.” 113 The court
reasoned that the Commonwealth could not fulfill its mandate to
“manage the corpus of the trust for the benefit of ‘all the people’”
if it could not consider the disparate effects of industrial uses in
its siting decisions.114
In its ruling, the court dismissed the Payne test as
incompatible with the text and purpose of the Amendment. 115
The court identified three primary infirmities in the Payne test:
that it described the Commonwealth’s obligations in far narrower
terms than the Amendment itself; that it assumed that judicial
relief was contingent upon legislative action; and that it
minimized the constitutional duties of executive agencies and the
judicial branch.116
As a result of these infirmities, the Robinson Township
court turned to the text of the Amendment and identified three
clauses therein.117 The court found that the Amendment’s first
clause establishes a private right “of citizens to clean air and pure
water, and to the preservation of natural, scenic, historic and
esthetic values of the environment”; it also “affirms a limitation
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 913.
58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3303 (2012) (“The Commonwealth by this
section, preempts and supersedes the local regulation of oil and gas operations
regulated by the environmental acts, as provided in this chapter.”).
110 Id. § 3304 (b).
111 Id. § 3304 (b)(3).
112 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 971–1000.
113 Id. at 980.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 967.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 950.
108
109
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on the state’s power to act contrary to this right.” 118 The
Amendment’s second and third clauses establish Pennsylvania’s
public natural resources as part of a public trust under the
common ownership of all people and impose fiduciary duties on
the Commonwealth to conserve and maintain those resources.119
The court interpreted the scope of “public natural
resources” broadly and as encompassing “not only state-owned
lands, waterways, and mineral reserves, but also resources that
implicate the public interest, such as ambient air, surface and
ground water, wild flora, and fauna (including fish) that are
outside the scope of purely private property.”120 The court also
recognized that, in enacting the Environmental Rights
Amendment, the Pennsylvania Legislature intended the
definition of “public natural resources” to “change over time to
conform, for example, with the development of related legal and
societal concerns.”121
Rather than merely affirming that the state holds public
natural resources in trust, the Robinson Township court
described at length the specific fiduciary duties imposed upon the
state. 122 The court held that state actors have duties “both
negative (i.e., prohibitory) and affirmative (i.e., implicating
enactment of legislation and regulations)” over the public natural
resources encompassed by the Amendment. 123 Furthermore,
drawing on private trust law, the Robinson Township court
identified three primary fiduciary duties—prudence, loyalty, and
impartiality—under which the Commonwealth is bound in its
Id. at 951.
Id. at 954–56. These public trust duties expand upon the traditional
American notion of the public trust doctrine, which historically centers on “[t]he
principle that navigable waters are preserved for the public use, and that the
state is responsible for protecting the public’s right to the use.” Public-Trust
Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). See also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 459 (1892) (“The soil under navigable waters being held
by the people of the state in trust for the common use and as a portion of their
inherent sovereignty, any act of legislation concerning their use affects the
public welfare.”).
120 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 955. Legislative history also suggests
that “public natural resources” has a broad scope, with Representative Kury
citing air pollution from vehicles on roads and highways as one of the
environmental harms the Amendment was meant to remediate. Dernbach &
Sonnenberg, supra note 86, at 189.
121 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 975. The court noted that Act 13 and
fracking affect the public natural resources of surface and ground water,
ambient air, and aspects of the natural environment in which the public has an
interest. Id. at 975.
122 Id. at 954–59.
123 Id. at 955–56.
118
119
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role as trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources.124 The
first of these duties requires trustees “to exercise ordinary skill,
prudence, and caution in managing the corpus of the trust”;125
the second requires them to “administer [the] trust solely in [the]
beneficiary’s interest.”126 It is the third of these duties—the duty
of impartiality—that directly relates to the equitable distribution
of environmental hazards.
In describing the duty of impartiality, the court stated
that “dealing impartially with all beneficiaries means that the
trustee must treat all equitably in light of the purposes of the
trust.” 127 Applying this duty, provisions of Act 13 were found
unconstitutional when the Legislature’s failure “to account for
local conditions cause[d] a disparate impact upon beneficiaries of
the trust.”128 Furthermore, the court found that the act violated
the duty of impartiality because “the Department of
Environmental Protection [was] not required, but [was] merely
permitted, to account for local concerns in its permit decisions . . .
[which] fail[ed] to ensure that any disparate effects [were]
attenuated.”129 The court likewise took issue with the fact that
the Act “marginalize[d] participation by residents, business
owners, and their elected representatives with environmental
and habitability concerns.”130 The court enjoined the application
and enforcement of the sections of the act that violated these
trustee duties.131
Because it was a plurality opinion, Robinson Township
itself is merely persuasive on future courts. 132 However, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s majority opinion in PEDF made
much of its analysis in Robinson Township binding law. 133
Importantly, that opinion—like Robinson Township—relied on
private trust law to determine that the state was bound by a duty
of impartiality in managing its public trust assets.134

Id. at 957.
Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 959.
128 Id. at 984.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1000.
132 Dernbach et al., Recognition of Environmental Rights, supra note
95, at 813.
133 See Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa.
2017).
134 Id. at 930–33.
124
125
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In PEDF, an environmental organization challenged the
Commonwealth’s decision to utilize proceeds from oil and gas
leases for non-conservation purposes as violating the state’s
trustee duties. 135 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
state entities could use proceeds generated from public trust
assets only for conservation and maintenance purposes. 136 In
doing so, the court solidified Robinson Township’s rejection of the
Payne test and declared that the text of the Amendment
“contains an express statement of the rights of the people and the
obligations of the Commonwealth with respect to the
conservation and maintenance of our public natural
resources.” 137 The court also quoted Robinson Township’s
imposition of the duties of prudence, loyalty, and impartiality,
and stated that “[t]he duty of impartiality requires the trustee to
manage the trust so as to give all of the beneficiaries due regard
for their respective interests in light of the purposes of the
trust.” 138 The court did not explicate on the duty further, nor
reiterate the Robinson Township plurality’s claim that the duty
requires state actors to attenuate disparate impacts arising from
their environmental decision-making. As a result, the aspects of
the Robinson Township opinion that most directly relate to the
environmental justice concerns discussed in Part II of this Note
remain merely persuasive on Pennsylvania courts. Part III.B
discusses the ramifications of this fact and examines the still
uncertain role of the duty of impartiality after PEDF.
B. Environmental Justice Under the Revamped Environmental
Rights Amendment
In its Robinson Township opinion, the court never
connects its concerns about disparate environmental impacts to
racial or socioeconomic discrimination. Yet, the court’s central
concern—the permitting of industrial uses without regard to the
preexisting character of the affected community—parallels
environmental justice advocates’ concerns about siting additional
environmental hazards in communities that already bear
disproportionate burdens. As the court recognized, permitting
industrial uses in certain communities creates a greater harm
than permitting them elsewhere.139 That is especially true when
those communities are already encumbered by other industrial
facilities.140 If the duty of impartiality requires state actors to
Id. at 925.
Id. at 935.
137 Id. at 916.
138 Id. at 932–33.
139 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 980 (Pa. 2013).
140 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
135
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consider local factors that cause certain communities to be
disproportionately impacted by siting decisions, there is no
reason why those factors could not encompass the cumulative
environmental risks already facing overburdened communities.
In this regard, Robinson Township can be understood to
have set the stage for environmental justice litigation
challenging the continued siting of environmental hazards in
low-income communities and communities of color that already
bear a disproportionate number of polluting facilities. Yet
following Robinson Township and PEDF, Pennsylvania courts
have not further explicated the state’s exact obligations under
the duty of impartiality, and the Robinson Township and PEDF
opinions in fact point to different understandings of those
obligations. This section accordingly analyzes different ways this
duty might be understood under current law, specifically as it
relates to the siting and permitting of environmental burdens in
overburdened communities.
PEDF, unlike Robinson Township, was a binding
majority opinion. The PEDF court described the duty of
impartiality as “requir[ing] the trustee to manage the trust so as
to give all of the beneficiaries due regard for their respective
interests in light of the purposes of the trust.”141 Taken alone,
this paragraph may be read as imposing on the state only
procedural requirements to consider the interests of all trust
beneficiaries—in this case, the communities affected by
environmental decision-making—before making a decision that
may or may not align with those interests. Such an
understanding would roughly follow the model imposed by
statutes such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
under which the judiciary analyzes whether a federal agency
adequately considered and disclosed its impact on the
environment as a matter of procedure, rather than considering
the substance or merits of an agency action.142
In contrast, the plurality opinion in Robinson Township
points to the duty of impartiality as a substantive duty that
requires agencies to avoid environmental decisions that produce
disparate impacts on certain communities. As discussed above,
the Robinson Township court found that the duty of impartiality
had been violated when the Legislature’s failure “to account for
local conditions cause[d] a disparate impact upon beneficiaries of
Pa. Env’t Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 933.
Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental
Policy Act: Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA’s Progeny, 16 HARV. ENV’T
L. REV. 207, 208 (1992).
141
142
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the trust,” and when the Legislature “fail[ed] to ensure that any
disparate effects [were] attenuated.” 143 While the first failure
aligns with the sort of procedural considerations that the PEDF
court would adopt, the second failure suggests that the
Legislature would violate its fiduciary duty of impartiality if it
produced disparate impacts without attenuating those impacts,
thereby imposing a more substantive obligation on the state. This
substantive obligation is reflected elsewhere in the opinion, such
as in the court’s insistence that “the disparate impact on some
citizens sanctioned by Section 3304 of Act 13 [is] incompatible
with the express command of the Environmental Rights
Amendment.”144
In Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Commonwealth,
which was adjudicated after Robinson Township and PEDF, the
Environmental Hearing Board had the opportunity to further
examine the relationship between the duty of impartiality and
state siting and permitting decisions.145 In a consolidated appeal,
environmental organizations and private residents challenged
PADEP’s decision to issue and reissue permits for fracking
wells.146 The appellants claimed that the Department “breached
its duty of impartiality by treating the Geyer Well Site as if it
were no different than any other wellsite, despite the presence of
a large, health-sensitive population nearby—children and by
approving an unknown amount of further degradation to local air
quality in a community that they assert is already suffering from
degraded air.” 147 In analyzing this claim, the Board repeated
PEDF’s characterization of the duty of impartiality, noting that
it “requires the trustee to manage the trust so as to give all of the
beneficiaries due regard for their respective interests in light of
the purposes of the trust.”148
Ultimately, the Board concluded that the Department
had not “failed to give due regard to the interests of the various
beneficiaries of the public natural resources in the vicinity of the
Geyer Well Site.”149 However, its reasoning rested primarily on
issues of evidence and failed to reveal much about the Board’s
understanding of PADEP’s obligations under the duty of
impartiality. The Board found that the appellant’s expert report
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 984.
Id. at 981.
145 Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Commonwealth, No. 2014-142-B, 2015157-B, 2018 WL 2294492 (Pa. Env’t Hearing Bd. May 11, 2018).
146 Id.
147 Id. at *32 (citations omitted).
148 Id. at *25.
149 Id. at *33.
143
144
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“was [not] sufficiently related to the particular circumstances at
the Geyer Well Site to require the Department to have given it
additional consideration beyond the review it conducted and the
requirements outlined in the Geyer Well Permits,” and decided
that the appellants had “not proven that there will be
unreasonable degradation of the local air quality as a result of
the Department’s permitting action.”150 The Board did not specify
what the Department’s obligations would have been had
appellants established that the Greyer Well Site would have
unreasonably degraded the local air quality. As a result, the
Board’s opinion failed to further solidify an understanding of the
duty of impartiality in Pennsylvania environmental law.
Following PEDF, PADEP has seemed to adopt a
procedural understanding of the duty of impartiality. In 2018,
PADEP’s Policy Office proposed an amendment to its
Environmental Justice Public Participation Policy that provides
non-binding procedures for community input when a company
applies for an environmental permit to operate in an
environmental justice community. In its proposed amendment,
PADEP suggests that these procedures for community input
satisfy the department’s obligations to low-income communities
and communities of color under the Environmental Rights
Amendment.151
The proposed Public Participation Policy reflects a
procedural understanding of the duty of impartiality, which is
satisfied by consideration of a decision’s impact on affected
communities. However, a deeper analysis of the duty of
impartiality in Pennsylvania law reveals that PADEP and the
Pennsylvania courts should also adopt the Robinson Township
decision’s substantive requirements. Part IV accordingly argues
Id.
PA. DEP’T ENV’T PROT. POL’Y OFF., 012-0501-002, DRAFT:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION POLICY 3 (June 13, 2018),
http://files.dep.state.pa.us/PublicParticipation/Office%20of%20Environmental
%20Advocacy/EnvAdvocacyPortalFiles/2018/0610/Draft%20EJ%20Public%20Participation%20Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/44A9-SEBE] (“The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) can be
used as a tool available to the community to address equal justice in low income
and minority communities, and may help the most vulnerable communities
while improving a sustainable Pennsylvania.”). While the quotation mentions
the “Equal Rights Amendment” rather than the “Environmental Rights
Amendment,” context indicates that PADEP in fact meant the latter. The
constitutional provision commonly referred to as Pennsylvania’s Equal Rights
Amendment does not relate to either environmental justice or low-income and
minority communities more generally, but instead mandates that “[e]quality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
150
151
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that the Pennsylvania judiciary should understand the duty of
impartiality as prohibiting the additional siting of environmental
hazards in communities that already bear disproportionate
burdens.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE DUTY OF
IMPARTIALITY IN PENNSYLVANIA LAW
Since PEDF, Pennsylvania courts have not defined the
exact scope of the duty of impartiality. The Robinson Township
court’s mandate that state actors must “treat all [beneficiaries]
equitably in light of the purposes of the trust” does not resolve
the issue, as differing conceptions of environmental equity would
result in differing state obligations. 152 In light of this
uncertainty, future Pennsylvania courts should take seriously
the PEDF court’s statement that “the proper standard of judicial
review [for the Environmental Rights Amendment] lies in the
text of Article I, Section 27 itself as well as the underlying
principles of Pennsylvania trust law in effect at the time of its
enactment.”153 Since the text of the Amendment does not detail
the state’s trustee duties, Pennsylvania trust law provides the
basis for my analysis of the state’s obligations.154
In order to analyze the duty of impartiality in the context
of environmental equity, Part IV.A first summarizes how
different conceptions of equitable treatment correlate with
different siting schemes. Part IV.B next analyzes how the duty of
152
153

2017).

Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 959 (Pa. 2013).
Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 930 (Pa.

154 The legislative history associated with the Amendment provides
little help in determining what conception of environmental equity the
Amendment embodies. Broadly speaking, the legislative history frames the
Amendment as a response to the depletion and degradation of humanity’s
physical environment. See Dernbach & Sonnenberg, supra note 86, at 188–90. It
does not consider the array of distributional concerns broadly encompassed
under the term “environmental justice.” The closest that the legislative history
gets to addressing matters of environmental inequality can be found in broad
statements about maintaining the environment for the benefit of everyone,
rather than a select few. In a Question and Answer accompanying the
Amendment’s adoption, Representative Kury, the Amendment’s Chief
Legislative Sponsor, clarified that the Amendment “establishes that the public
natural resources of the Commonwealth belong to all the people, including
future generations, and that the Commonwealth is to serve as Trustee of our
natural resources for future generations.” Id. at 270. He further stated that
“[t]he Resolution would benefit all of the people, and would go a long way toward
tempering any individual, company, or governmental body which may have an
adverse impact on our natural or historic assets.” Id. While these statements
may emphasize the Amendment’s broad applicability, they do not explain how
the government should manage its public trust resources nor clarify whether the
Amendment could or should serve as a baseline for progressive siting.
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impartiality functions in Pennsylvania trust law and argues that
it imposes substantive requirements on trustees to avoid actions
that would harm one trust beneficiary for the benefit of another,
along with procedural requirements to consider the interests of
all beneficiaries in the first place. Finally, Part IV.C argues that
Pennsylvania courts, in maintaining fidelity to Pennsylvania
trust law, should enforce a scheme of substantive environmental
equity, in which state actors are prohibited from the continued
siting and permitting of environmental hazards in communities
that already bear disproportionate environmental burdens.
A. Differing Conceptions of Environmental Equity
As the duty of impartiality requires state actors to “treat
all [beneficiaries] equitably in light of the purposes of the
trust,” 155 future courts deciding the limits of the duty of
impartiality must provide a definition for “equitable” treatment.
The definition is not self-evident, as New York University Law
Professor Vicki Been makes clear in her 1993 article What’s
Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting
of Locally Undesirable Land Uses. 156 In her article, Professor
Been “explores what various conceptions of equality would look
like if translated into concrete siting programs.”157 The article
considers the siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses (LULUs)
generally, a category which includes environmental hazards such
as waste sites alongside other land uses including homeless
shelters and low-income housing. Her study originates from a
recognition that “different theories of fairness should lead to
radically different siting programs, so that one cannot adequately
evaluate a fair siting proposal without first identifying its
underlying conception of fairness.”158 As the duty of impartiality
centers on treating all beneficiaries equitably, different
understandings of equity or fairness should generate different
understandings of the obligation of the state and the courts in
upholding the duty.
Professor Been begins her study by outlining seven
conceptions of fairness and grouping them into three categories:
those that focus on the pattern of distribution of LULUs, those
that focus on the efficiency of the distribution, and those that

Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 959.
Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental
Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
1001 (1993).
157 Id. at 1006.
158 Id. at 1009.
155
156
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focus on the procedure by which the distribution was effected.159
The first category includes conceptions of fairness as requiring
equal division between the burdens of LULUs, in terms of either
pure geographic distribution or compensation for unequal
distribution of burdens; as requiring progressive siting of LULUs
in advantaged neighborhoods; and as requiring an equal initial
split of LULUs and competitive bidding for and against LULUs
after the initial split. 160 The second category encompasses a
notion of fairness as cost-internalization, in which those that
benefit from LULUs internalize the costs through physical
distribution or compensation schemes. 161 Finally, the third
category encompasses fairness as requiring the treatment of
individuals and communities as equals, leading to siting
processes that are equally attentive to the interests of all
communities regardless of race or class.162
This final, procedural conception of fairness drives the
“impact statement” approach of environmental justice, in which
“agencies must consider the concentration of uses in choosing or
approving sites.” 163 The impact statement approach underlays
President Clinton’s Executive Order 12898 (“Federal Actions To
Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and
Low-Income Populations”), which focuses on “identifying and
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse
human health or environmental effects of [agency] programs,
policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income
populations,” 164 without requiring that environmental justice
factors “play a determining factor in siting, rulemaking, and
permitting decisions.”165
In contrast, the first category of fairness underpins
legislation that requires dispersion and deconcentration of
LULUs by prohibiting their siting in communities once those
communities reach a certain threshold concentration, along with
legislation that requires all communities bear a “fair share” of
LULUs. 166 Such legislation imposes substantive obligations on
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1028–55.
161 Id. at 1055–60.
162 Id. at 160–68.
163 Id. at 172.
164 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7,629, 7,629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
165 Albert Huang, The 20th Anniversary of President Clinton’s Executive
Order 12898 on Environmental Justice, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Feb. 10, 2014),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/albert-huang/20th-anniversary-presidentclintons-executive-order-12898-environmental-justice [https://perma.cc/8QEYM6X2].
166 Been, supra note 156, at 1068–72, 1074–76.
159
160
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the state, prohibiting siting and permitting decisions when those
decisions have discriminatory effects. Of course, in order to fulfill
these substantive obligations, the state must first consider the
impact of potential decisions on affected groups. In other words,
procedural
requirements
for
the
identification
of
disproportionate impacts are necessary preconditions for the
implementation of a dispersive or progressive siting scheme. As
Part IV.B demonstrates, this mixture of substantive and
procedural obligations, rather than the merely procedural
requirements of the “impact statement” approach, most readily
parallels the obligations imposed on trustees by the duty of
impartiality in Pennsylvania trust law.
B. The Duty of Impartiality in Pennsylvania Private Trust Law
A survey of how the duty of impartiality functions in
Pennsylvania trust law reveals that it imposes both substantive
and procedural obligations on trustees. In surveying
Pennsylvania trust law, this section begins by analyzing the five
sources cited by the Robinson Township and PEDF courts, which
together provide a substantial but non-exhaustive account of the
duty of impartiality at the time of the enactment of the
Environmental Rights Amendment. The Robinson Township
court provided three citations for the duty of impartiality in
Pennsylvania trust law: 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 7773,
Restatement (Second) of Trusts section 232 (Impartiality
between Successive Beneficiaries), and the 1980 Pennsylvania
Supreme Court opinion from In re Hamill’s Estate.167 The PEDF
court additionally cited Restatement (Second) of Trusts section
183 and the 1979 Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion in Estate
of Sewell.168
Of these sources, neither 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 7773,
which implements in Pennsylvania Law section 803 of the
Uniform Trust Code, nor the Restatement (Second) of Trusts
clarifies the extent to which the duty of impartiality imposes
substantive obligations on trustees. However, both In re Hamill’s
Estate and Estate of Sewell indicate that the courts understood
the duty as imposing substantive obligations,169 a view which is
supported by the more recent Restatement (Third) of Trusts.170

167
168

2017).

Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 959 (Pa. 2013).
Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 933 (Pa.

169 Estate of Sewell, 409 A.2d 401, 402 (Pa. 1979); In re Hamill’s Estate,
410 A.2d 770, 773 (Pa. 1980).
170 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2007).
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20 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 7773 reads as follows:
If a trust has two or more beneficiaries, the
trustee shall act impartially in investing,
managing and distributing the trust property,
giving due regard to the beneficiaries’ respective
interests in light of the purposes of the trust. The
duty to act impartially does not mean that the
trustee must treat the beneficiaries equally.
Rather, the trustee must treat the beneficiaries
equitably in light of the purposes of the trust.171
Under this statute, the trustee must give “due regard” to the
beneficiaries’ interests; in other words, the trustee must consider
those interests when investing, managing, and distributing the
trust property.172 Beyond that requirement, the trustee must “act
impartially” and “treat the beneficiaries equitably.”173 However,
as discussed above, demands for “equitable” treatment do not
necessarily correlate with demands for substantive equity and
could, in theory, be satisfied by mere consideration of the
beneficiaries’ interests. The Uniform Law Comment associated
with the statute does not resolve the ambiguity. It states that,
“[i]n fulfilling the duty to act impartially, the trustee should be
particularly sensitive to allocation of receipts and disbursements
between income and principal and should consider, in an
appropriate case, a reallocation of income to the principal account
and vice versa, if allowable under local law.” 174 While this
comment suggests that decisions as to future allocation of trust
assets can be based on past inequities, it does not mandate that
trustees act in a certain way.
Restatement (Second) of Trusts sections 183 and 232 also
fail to provide significant clarity. Section 183 states in part:
“When there are two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee
is under a duty to deal impartially with them.”175 Section 232
does little more than expand the general rule contained in section
183 to successive beneficiaries, reading: “If a trust is created for
beneficiaries in succession, the trustee is under a duty to the
successive beneficiaries to act with due regard to their respective
interests.” 176 Neither of these sections explain what specific
actions trustees must take to satisfy their obligations under the
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7773 (2020).
Id.
173 Id.
174 20 PA. Stat. and Cons. Stat.§ 7773 uniform law cmt. (West 2020).
175 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (AM. L. INST. 1959).
176 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 232 (AM. L. INST. 1959).
171
172
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duty. However, the editors’ comments to the sections are of more
help; in particular, comments under section 232 clearly indicate
that the duty imposes substantive obligations on the trustee.177
Comment b of section 232 provides the clearest
explication of the substantive obligations imposed under the duty
of impartiality. It outlines the trustee’s duties to successive
beneficiaries, including the duty “not to sacrifice income for the
purpose of increasing the value of the principal,” and the “duty to
a life beneficiary not to purchase or retain unproductive
property.” 178 While these particular substantive obligations
specifically apply in the context of subsequent beneficiaries, case
law indicates that substantive obligations also apply in the
context of simultaneous beneficiaries.179
The private trust law cases that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court cited in Robinson Township and PEDF both
indicate that the duty of impartiality imposes substantive
obligations on trustees. In In re Hamill’s Estate, the court cited
section 232 comment b to support the rule that a trustee has an
obligation to maintain the trust for the benefit of present and
future beneficiaries and should not sacrifice the interest of one
for the other.180 In Estate of Sewell, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found that a trustee violated the duty when the trustee (1)
failed to “confirm appellant’s status as a beneficiary” and (2)
“continu[ed] to make payments of trust income to” a single
beneficiary. 181 The duty here is twofold and encompasses
obligations both procedural—the duty to consider the status of

177

1959).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 232 cmt. b. (AM. L. INST.

178 Id. Comments under section 183 indicate that a trustee may be
empowered to favor one beneficiary over the other if the trust or will at issue
clearly indicates an intent for such favoritism. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 183 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1959) (“By the terms of the trust the trustee
may have discretion to favor one beneficiary over another. The court will not
control the exercise of such discretion, except to prevent the trustee from abusing
it”). In Estate of Pew, a private trust case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
analyzed this comment and stated that “[w]hether or not the testator has
empowered his trustees here to favor the named income beneficiaries over the
charitable remainderman, or vice versa, is a question of intent.” 655 A.2d 521,
542 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). The Court further clarified that such “intent must be
derived from an examination of the entire will, viewed in the light of the
circumstances of the testator.” Id.
179 See Estate of Sewell, 409 A.2d 401, 402 (Pa. 1979) (holding that a
trustee whose status is not open to dispute is entitled to trust income along with
other trustees).
180 In re Hamill’s Estate 410 A.2d 770, 773 (Pa. 1980).
181 Estate of Sewell, 409 A.2d at 402.
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all beneficiaries—and substantive—allocating payments in an
equitable fashion.
More recently, in Snyder v. Commonwealth, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:
[In the case of] a trust with two life beneficiaries,
neither of whom’s needs were to be considered
dominant, the trustee was required to carefully
consider how his actions toward one beneficiary
would affect the other; and he could not justifiably
act to benefit one when to do so would irreparably
damage the interest of the other.182
In this framing, the question of whether the trustee intended to
benefit one beneficiary over the other is not determinative; the
key issue is whether the trustee did in fact create disparate
effects by benefitting one beneficiary while hurting the other.
These cases, two of which were cited in the Robinson Township
and PEDF opinions, together indicate that the duty of
impartiality is both procedural and substantive.
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts section 79 (Duty of
Impartiality; Income
Productivity)
has upheld
that
understanding of the duty. A comment under section 79 identifies
“‘substantive’ aspects of impartiality.” 183 These substantive
aspects require trustees to “avoid injecting their personal
favoritism into their decision[-]making and conduct in trust
administration and . . . make diligent and good-faith efforts to
identify, respect, and balance the various beneficial interests
when carrying out the trustees’ fiduciary responsibilities in
managing, protecting, and distributing the trust estate, and in
other administrative functions.”184 This comment clarifies that
the trustee must both “identify” and “balance” the beneficiaries’
interests: obligations that are procedural and substantive. 185
Furthermore, in requiring trustees to balance the beneficiaries’
interests, the Restatement imposes a duty to avoid inequitable
trust allocation even when that allocation does not derive from
an intentional decision to favor one beneficiary at the expense of
another.
182 Snyder v. Commonwealth, 598 A.2d 1283, 1287 (Pa. 1991). Other
Pennsylvania cases touch on the duty of impartiality without adding substantive
analysis. See, e.g., In re Neafie’s Estate, 191 A. 56 (Pa. 1937); In re Tr. Under
Agreement of Kaiser, 572 A.2d 734 (Pa. 1990); In re Weiss’s Estate, 309 A.2d 793
(Pa. 1973); In re Longbotham’s Estate, 29 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1943).
183 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. c (AM. L. INST.. 2007).
184 Id.
185 Id.
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This study of Pennsylvania trust law reveals that the
duty of impartiality imposes both procedural and substantive
requirements on the state. Following the Robinson Township and
PEDF courts’ usage of Pennsylvania private trust law as the
basis for its understanding of the state’s public trust duties,186
Pennsylvania courts should require the state to not only consider
whether siting and permitting decisions would have a disparate
impact on certain communities, but also to actually avoid those
impacts. As such, the duty of impartiality should allow litigants
a cause of action against the sort of disparate impact
environmental discrimination litigated under the Civil Rights
Act prior to Sandoval.
C. Shaping an Environmental Justice Claim Under the Duty of
Impartiality
Causes of action under the duty of impartiality could take
several forms. Following in the footsteps of the Robinson
Township and PEDF petitioners, litigants may file a Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to Pennsylvania’s
Declaratory Judgments Act, seeking the Commonwealth Court
to declare Pennsylvania’s current permitting scheme
unconstitutional. Litigants could alternatively appeal the
issuance of specific permits that disproportionately impact
overburdened communities. Litigants may also have claims
against municipalities or local land use boards that have used
their zoning powers to concentrate environmental hazards in
communities of color, although such a claim follows less directly
from Robinson Township’s discussion of disparate impacts
arising from the permitting process.
1. Claims Under the Declaratory Judgments Act
Pennsylvania’s Declaratory Judgments Act provides that
“[c]ourts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, shall
have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations,”
and that such “declaration[s] may be either affirmative or
negative in form and effect . . . [and] shall have the force and
effect of a final judgement or decree.”187 The Robinson Township
petitioners challenged Act 13 under the Declaratory Judgments
Act, 188 and the PEDF petitioners used this act to seek the
Commonwealth Court’s declaration as to whether Pennsylvania’s

186 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 954–59 (Pa. 2013);
Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 930 (Pa. 2017).
187 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7532 (2020).
188 Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 990.
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Fiscal Code and the General Assembly’s fiscal appropriations
violated the Environmental Rights Amendment.189
Litigants could likewise use the Declaratory Judgments
Act to seek the court’s declaration as to whether the
Commonwealth’s environmental permitting legislation and
PADEP’s implementing regulations violate the Environmental
Rights Amendment by failing to include a mechanism for
preventing the continued siting of environmental hazards in
overburdened communities. Of course, the regulatory scheme
governing the permitting of environmental hazards differs
depending on the facility being permitted—for example, waste
facilities as opposed to hydraulic fracturing wells—and litigants
would have to separately challenge the permitting of different
sorts of environmental hazards. Given the Robinson Township
and PEDF petitioners’ success in using the Declaratory
Judgments Act to challenge state action under the
Environmental Rights Amendment, this procedure stands out as
the most feasible method to challenge Pennsylvania’s siting
scheme.
In a successful Declaratory Judgments Act petition, the
court’s order would declare the applicable statutes or regulations
unconstitutional, and the General Assembly and/or PADEP
would then be tasked with remedying that unconstitutionality.
In doing so, the federal Environmental Equal Rights Act of 1993
could provide one model for how to incorporate distributive
criteria into permitting decisions to remedy any constitutional
violation. The Environmental Equal Rights Act was an
unsuccessful attempt to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act to
incorporate racial criteria into evaluations of siting approvals.190
Under the act, affected citizens could have challenged the siting
of a waste facility if the proposed location was within two miles
of another waste facility, Superfund site, or facility that releases
toxic contaminants; the proposed location was within a
community with a higher than average percentage of low-income
people or people of color; and the proposed facility would have
adversely affected the human health, air, soil, or other
environmental asset of the community or a portion of the
community.191 The challenge would fail if the defendant could
prove that no alternative location existed within the state that
posed fewer risks to human health and the environment and that
the proposed facility would not release contaminants or was
Pa. Env’t Def. Found., 161 A.3d at 925.
H.R. 1924, 103d Cong. (1993).
191 Id.
189
190
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unlikely to increase the cumulative impact of contaminants on
any residents of the community.192 While these exact protocols
are merely one example of standards by which to incorporate
environmental equity concerns into permitting decisions, they
could serve as a template for legislation and regulation seeking
to incorporate the duty of impartiality.
2. PADEP Permit Appeals
In addition to challenging the statutory and regulatory
schemes for the permitting of environmental hazards under the
Declaratory Judgments Act, affected citizens and community
groups can also directly challenge the issuance of environmental
permits for facilities to be operated in disproportionately
burdened communities. The specific mechanisms for such a
challenge would vary based on the type of facility being
permitted. For example, 25 Pa. Code section 271.201 provides
permit criteria for the approval of municipal waste facilities.
That regulation mandates that a “permit application will not be
approved unless the applicant affirmatively demonstrates
that . . . [t]he requirements of PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 have been
complied with.”193 Community groups could use this regulation
to sue PADEP for violating the duty of impartiality by issuing a
municipal waste permit in a community that already bears a
disproportionate burden. The Municipal Waste Planning,
Recycling and Waste Reduction Act requires PADEP to
“[a]dminister the municipal waste planning, recycling and waste
reduction program pursuant to the provisions of this act and the
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto,”194 and provides that
“any aggrieved person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf against any person who is alleged to be in violation of this
act.” 195 The Environmental Hearing Board has original
jurisdiction over citizen suit actions brought against PADEP
under the aforementioned provision,196 and the Commonwealth
Court in turn has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over any
Environmental Hearing Board final order. 197 Litigants could
accordingly use 25 Pa. Code section 271.201 to challenge
PADEP’s failure to comply with the duty of impartiality by
permitting a waste facility in an already disproportionately
burdened community.
Id.
25 PA. CODE § 271.201.
194 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4000.301(a) (2020).
195 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4000.1711(a) (2020).
196 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4000.1711(b) (2020).
197 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 763(a)(2) (2020).
192
193
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Since “the public trust provisions of Section 27 are selfexecuting,”198 affected individuals could challenge facilities even
if the governing regulations for permitting of those facilities do
not explicitly incorporate the Environmental Rights
Amendment. Pennsylvania administrative law provides that
“[a]ny person aggrieved by an adjudication of a Commonwealth
agency who has a direct interest in such adjudication shall have
the right to appeal therefrom to the court vested with jurisdiction
of such appeals.”199 Parties can use such an appeal to “question[]
the validity of the statute” which governed the agency action.200
As a result, permit appeals could be a forum for challenging
permitting schemes that fail to adequately fulfill the
Commonwealth’s duty of impartiality by attenuating the
disparate impacts of permitting decisions.
3. Challenges to Municipalities or Local Agencies
While the most obvious defendant for a duty of
impartiality claim would be PADEP or the Commonwealth as a
whole, suits could also proceed against local governments and
land use agencies that concentrate environmental hazards in
overburdened communities via zoning or other land use
decisions. The Robinson Township court implied that
municipalities are bound by the same trust obligations as the
state, noting in dicta that “[t]he aggrievement alleged by the
political subdivisions is not limited to vindication of individual
citizens’ rights but extends to allegations that the challenged
statute interferes with the subdivisions’ constitutional duties
respecting the environment and, therefore, its interests and
functions as a governing entity.”201 In asserting that subdivisions
have constitutional duties to respect the environment, the court
opened the door for litigation directly challenging municipalities’
abuse of discretion in exercising those duties. 202
198

2017).

Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 937 (Pa.

2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 702 (2020). A party’s interest must also be
substantial. See MEC Pa. Racing v. Pa. State Horse Racing Comm’n, 827 A.2d
580, 588 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003), as amended (July 15, 2003). A “direct” interest
arises when the adjudication causes harm to the appellant’s interest, and a
“substantial” interest arises when there is a discernible adverse effect to an
interest other than the abstract interest of all citizens in having others comply
with the law. See id. (citing Pa. Auto. Ass’n v. State Bd. of Vehicle Mfr., Dealers
& Salespersons, 550 A.2d 1041, 1043 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988); William Penn
Parking Garage Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975)).
200 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 703 (2020).
201 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 920 (Pa. 2013).
202 Dernbach et al., Examination and Implications, supra note 103, at
1185.
199
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More recently, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
addressed the extent to which the Environmental Rights
Amendment binds local governments.203 The court noted that,
“[w]hen a municipality enacts a zoning ordinance, it is bound by
the Environmental Rights Amendment and by all the rights
protected in Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” 204
However, the court also found that Robinson Township “did not
give municipalities the power to act beyond the bounds of their
enabling legislation,” meaning that “[m]unicipalities lack the
power to replicate the environmental oversight that the General
Assembly has conferred upon DEP and other state agencies.”205
Finally, the court noted that, in the context of oil and gas
development, “a municipality may use its zoning powers only to
regulate where mineral extraction takes place . . . [and] does not
regulate how the gas drilling will be done.”206 While this decision
limited municipalities’ environmental obligations, it did not rule
out potential actions against them for violating the duty of
impartiality since environmental justice in this context is
precisely a matter of where the permitted activity takes place.
Accordingly, causes of action can arise at the level of local land
use decision-making, rather than being confined to permitting
decisions by PADEP and other state-wide actors.
Litigants could use the Declaratory Judgments Act to
seek a declaration that the actions of municipalities or local land
use agencies violated the duty of impartiality. Alternatively, they
could appeal the decision of a local land use agency pursuant to
2 Pa. Cons. Stat. section 752, which provides that “[a]ny person
aggrieved by an adjudication of a local agency who has a direct
interest in such adjudication shall have the right to appeal
therefrom to the court vested with jurisdiction of such
appeals.” 207 These local actions would allow individuals the
opportunity to challenge the zoning decisions that underlay the
inequitable permitting of environmental hazards,208 rather than
only challenging the permitting schemes themselves.

203 Frederick v. Allegheny Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 196 A.3d 677, 695
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018), appeal denied, 208 A.3d 462 (Pa. 2019).
204 Id.
205 Id. at 697.
206 Id.
207 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 752 (2020).
208 See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text.
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V. THE POSSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE LITIGATION UNDER THE DUTY OF
IMPARTIALITY IN OTHER STATES
The PEDF court found Pennsylvania’s obligations under
the Environmental Rights Amendment to be relatively unique,
claiming that “Pennsylvania deliberately chose a course different
from virtually all of its sister states,” and arguing that this was
a reflection of “the Commonwealth’s experience of having the
benefit of vast natural resources whose virtually unrestrained
exploitation, while initially a boon to investors, industry, and
citizens, led to destructive and lasting consequences not only for
the environment but also for the citizens’ quality of life.” 209
Despite these claims, Pennsylvania is not wholly unique in
incorporating the public trust doctrine into its constitution. This
section accordingly analyzes other states’ constitutions to
identify where jurisprudential developments similar to those
associated with Robinson Township may be possible. This survey
merely identifies which states are the likeliest candidates for
such developments and should not be understood to categorically
rule out the possibility of similar developments elsewhere.
Of course, the most direct way for the duty to be
incorporated in other states or federally is through direct
adoption of new constitutional amendments that codify the
government’s duty. As a result of Robinson Township and the
revamped Environmental Rights Amendment jurisprudence, a
“Green
Amendment
Movement”
has
advocated
for
“constitutional-level protections for the inalienable right for a
healthy environment in every constitution, in every state across
the nation, and eventually at the federal level.” 210 Robinson
Township co-plaintiff and Delaware Riverkeeper Maya van
Rossum has specifically advocated for the nation-wide adoption
of constitutional amendments that would impose duties of
impartiality on state actors under the theory that such
amendments would serve environmental justice goals by
preventing said actors from “target[ing] or sacrific[ing] a single
community with repeated environmental harm in order to better
protect the environment, health, goals, and rights of another

209

2017).

Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 918–19 (Pa.

210 Natasha Geiling, The Radical Movement to Make Environmental
Protections a Constitutional Right, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 22, 2017, 1:18 PM),
https://archive.thinkprogress.org/green-amendment-movement-45a19f7c1ce7/
[https://perma.cc/6J8H-AEAF].
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community.” 211 At the federal level, the adoption of an
environmental amendment that directly imposes responsibilities
on the federal government has long been a focus of advocates,212
but the ratification of such an amendment does not seem likely
in the near future.
Since the possibility of passing state or federal
amendments largely comes down to political will, and the federal
judiciary has casted doubt on the existence of a federal public
trust doctrine,213 this Note instead analyzes which states already
have the constitutional framework for the judicial application of
fiduciary duties including the duty of impartiality. Because the
duty arises as a public trust obligation, it could serve to
invigorate environmental justice advocacy in states with
expansive constitutional public trust doctrines, particularly in
those states that foreground the duty of impartiality in their
private trust law. If a state has both, then it is a good candidate
for the imposition of the duty in the public trust context.
While the constitutions of forty-two states mention the
environment or natural resource conservation, 214 only three
states—Virginia, 215 Pennsylvania, 216 and Hawaii 217 —explicitly
use public trust language in their environmental provisions. And
while Virginia’s constitution establishes that the Commonwealth
has a policy “to protect its atmosphere, lands, and waters from
pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment,
and general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth,” the only
resources explicitly held in trust are “[t]he natural oyster beds,
rocks, and shoals in the waters of the Commonwealth.” 218 In
contrast to the limited public trust assets defined in Virginia’s
constitution, Hawaii provides a broad framework for a

211 Maya K. van Rossum, Letter in Support of Maryland House Bill 472,
GREEN
AMENDS.
FOR
GENERATIONS
(Feb.
20,
2019),
https://forthegenerations.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/SD-MD-20190220Mkvr-Testimony-and-Attachments.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNL5-YS8U].
212 See Lynton K. Caldwell, The Case for an Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States for Protection of the Environment: Affirming
Responsibilities Rather Than Declaring Rights May Be the Most Promising Route
to the Objective, 1 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 1 (1991).
213 See Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App'x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (citing PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012)).
214 Klee, supra note 8, at 167.
215 VA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
216 PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
217 HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
218 VA. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
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constitutional public trust that could incorporate the duty of
impartiality as a limit on environmental decision-making.219
Like Pennsylvania, Hawaii’s Constitution explicitly
incorporates the language of environmental rights 220 and the
public trust. Its public trust provision reads:
For the benefit of present and future generations,
the State and its political subdivisions shall
conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and
all natural resources, including land, water, air,
minerals and energy sources, and shall promote
the development and utilization of these resources
in a manner consistent with their conservation
and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the
State.
All public natural resources are held in trust by
the State for the benefit of the people.221
By its terms, this provision should establish the same sort of
public trust obligation as Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights
Amendment. Furthermore, Hawaii’s constitutional provisions
regarding the environment, like Pennsylvania’s Environmental
Rights Amendment, are self-executing. 222 As of now, the
Hawaiian courts have limited the “public natural resources”
governed by encompassed by article 11, section 1 to “natural
resources which are or have been in the possession of the
State.”223 This differs from the Robinson Township court’s claim
that the state holds in trust all natural resources that implicate
the public interest. 224 Even still, the public trust assets
encompassed by this provision are far broader than those
encompassed by the common law public trust doctrine in most
225
states.
HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
Article 11, section 9 of Hawaii’s constitution, which establishes
environmental rights, reads as follows: “Each person has the right to a clean and
healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality,
including control of pollution and conservation, protection and enhancement of
natural resources. Any person may enforce this right against any party, public
or private, through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable
limitations and regulation as provided by law.” HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
221 HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
222 Kent D. Morihara, Hawai’i Constitution, Article XI, Section 1: The
Conservation, Protection, and Use of Natural Resources, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 177,
214 (1997).
223 Id. at 198.
224 Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 955 (Pa. 2013).
225 See Alexandra B. Klass, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Shadow of
State Environmental Rights Laws: A Case Study, 45 ENV’T L. 431, 439 (2015)
219
220
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Hawaii trust law cites the Restatement (Third) of Trusts
section 79 when discussing the duty of impartiality. 226 As
discussed above, section 79 imposes substantive obligations on
trustees. 227 As such, Hawaii is likely the state where the
judiciary could most readily establish that fiduciary duties
including the duty of impartiality apply in the public trust
context, thereby creating a constitutional mandate for equity in
environmental decision-making.
Of course, similar developments may prove possible
elsewhere. Yet, pending constitutional amendment, more
barriers currently exist to applying the duty of impartiality in the
public trust context in other states. For one, certain state
constitutions such as Montana’s impose trust-like obligations on
the state and even private parties without explicitly stating that
the state holds environmental resources in “trust.” 228 As the
Robinson Township and PEDF courts’ use of the duty of
impartiality arose from an analogy to private trust law, the
absence of trust language in constitutions such as Montana’s will
likely stand in the way of similar jurisprudential developments.
Furthermore, for states in which the public trust doctrine
remains a matter of common law, public trust assets are
generally limited to navigable waters and submerged lands and
do not encompass other natural resources, such as the air, which
are most frequently impacted by permitting decisions.229 While
some states including New York and New Jersey have somewhat
expanded the scope of public trust assets through the common
law, 230 they have failed to approach the scope of public trust
(“This writing illustrates how litigants have now used the public trust doctrine
for over four decades in efforts to protect traditional water-based resources as
well as, in some states, public lands, parks, shoreland and beaches, the
atmosphere, animals, and plant species. However, it is important to keep in
mind that in the majority of states, the public trust doctrine remains limited to
navigable waters and submerged lands and has not been extended beyond access
to and use of those resources.”).
226 Awakuni v. Awana, 165 P.3d 1027, 1036 (Haw. 2007).
227 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2007).
228 See MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The state and each person shall
maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present
and future generations.”).
229 See Klass, supra note 225, at 439.
230See Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing
Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 707–08 (2006)
(“In certain states, courts have expanded the doctrine from its historic domain
of ensuring public access to navigable waters to protecting use, access to, and
preservation of all waters usable for recreational purposes, the dry sand area of
beaches for public recreation purposes, parklands, wildlife and wildlife habitat
connected to navigable waters, drinking water resources, and inland wetlands.
Courts have also used the doctrine to resolve water appropriation issues and
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assets contained in Pennsylvania’s and Hawaii’s constitutions.
As a result, the framework does not currently exist in those states
for the sort of jurisprudential developments exemplified by
Robinson Township and PEDF. Advocates in those states should
therefore continue to push for a constitutional amendment that
incorporates the public trust doctrine and requires state actors
to manage environmental resources in a sustainable and
equitable fashion.
VI. CONCLUSION
While largely untested, Pennsylvania’s Environmental
Rights Amendment’s imposition of the duty of impartiality on
state actors should provide a significant tool for litigation
targeting environmental racism and discrimination. In light of
the recent Robinson Township and PEDF decisions,
Pennsylvania agencies must consider the cumulative impact of
previous environmental decision-making when making siting
and permitting decisions and cease siting and permitting
environmental hazards in communities that already bear a
disproportionate burden. Furthermore, as the public trust
doctrine and environmental constitutionalism continue to evolve
in other states, the duty could help ensure that states are
protecting all residents’ environments equally. Of course, that
result is far from guaranteed, but given the many roadblocks
facing federal environmental justice litigation, such a stateoriented approach is one worth pursuing.

have held that even preexisting water rights may be curtailed if necessary to
prevent reduction of water in inland streams or lakes that provide aesthetic
values or habitats for animal and plant species or other natural resources.”).

